The study of voting behaviour in social sciences gained attention with the rising popularity of behavioural studies within humanities. Voting is the most widespread as well as explicitly quantifiable instance of political behaviour that can be used to analyse political cultures, make political predictions and gauge public opinion about government action. While voting behaviour is influenced by a range of short-term factors, it is the long-term factors, which can be expressed via theories and models, that determine the context within which public response (quantified in number of votes) is assessed. Long-term influences help construct patterns of voter behaviour that are not bound by a single instance of voting. They condition the voter to vote in a certain manner and create circumstances for the said patterns to unfold within the structures they operate in.
Elections serve as an expression of public aspirations and political assessments by citizens. The Indian electoral system has been in a constant state of deliberation since its inception. It has been subject to intense scrutiny and revisions by governments and independent committees in the following decades. However, it was with the proposal of “One Nation, One Poll” by the incumbent government in 2017 that electoral reforms have gathered unparalleled public furore.
Structural changes in the way citizens experience elections undoubtedly affect the psychological, sociological, economic and ideological influences on voting. Therefore, it becomes crucial to analyse the political structure within which voters express themselves or might express themselves consistently over some time. This delivers a deterministic political behaviour, viable enough to be expressed via theory or behavioural model. Since a relationship of causation exists between political frameworks and behaviours, assessed patterns of the latter change with changes in the former.
While much has been discussed about the structural and economic ramifications of the said action, the popular discussion has largely steered clear of the way the behavioural aspects of the act of voting itself will be affected by the execution of simultaneous elections. This piece tries to use two prominent models of analysing voting behaviour – dominant ideology model and rational choice model – to discuss how simultaneous elections will affect how an average voter votes. It must be noted here, however, that the suggested theoretical models are meant to reason out one of the plausible behaviours among voters rather than being absolute reasons in themselves.
SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Simultaneous elections primarily imply structuring of the electoral cycle in a manner that allows for synchronisation of elections at both the national and the state levels to be conducted at the same time. In such a scenario, it is proposed that elections will be held in a phased manner across the country and voters will cast their vote for electing members of both tiers of the government on a single day (Debroy & Desai, 2017).
The synchronisation of the electoral cycle is not a new phenomenon. Ever since the first election of 1950, general elections and state elections were scheduled at the same time by convention. This synchrony was broken in 1971 when then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked for the dissolution of the House of the People and conduction of elections before the government could complete its five-year tenure. 1971 saw a massive victory for the Indian National Congress at the national level, which further aided the party’s success in imminent elections, as predicted by her. It was the establishment of a single narrative of Mrs Gandhi being a strong PM who could lead the country during a time of war that ensured an all-round victory for the Congress. Through use of statements like “India is Indira. Indira is India”, she gained a strong political preeminence. Successive developments like the coalition era and consequent instability of the subsequent governments altered the election cycle to detangle the synchronisation between the general elections and state elections.
EXISTING LITERATURE
The 2018 Law Commission Report on simultaneous elections stated the incompatibility that legislators will face in implementing simultaneous elections within the current Constitutional framework; hence, the said move will require an amendment in the Constitution that has to be ratified by the states (PRS, 2018).
While the popular debate has shared various arguments regarding the possibility of a reduction in the overall costs of election and better implementation of government policies in the aftermath of its implementation (The Hindu, 2018), the political ramifications still need to be addressed in detail. The NITI Ayog report on simultaneous elections, much like other reports, dismisses the question of voter behaviour by simply stating that “correlation does not imply causation” without delving into the complexity of voting behaviour itself and chiding any opposition for calling out the average voter “naive” (ADR, 2016).
It becomes important to mention that an IDFC study shows that when voters are handed two ballots at the same time to choose their representative for both Parliament and state assembly, they chose the same party in 77 per cent of the cases. Moreover, this trend of choosing the same party increased from 68 per cent in 1999, to 86 per cent in 2014. When this cycle was broken, only 48 per cent of the constituencies produced the same party winner (Chakravarty, 2016). The statistics mentioned here might not seem alarming at first glance but they do show the possibility of a sharp disavowal from ideals of Federalism and possible renunciation of political and cultural diversity that elections, as structured under the Indian Constitution, work towards ensuring. When the same party forms the government at both the national and the state level, it leaves states with less bargaining power while acting on their executive functions and reduces the possibility of representation of various political ideas. Social and cultural positions of an individual also contribute towards their association with a political party. Hence, when members of a single party occupy offices on multiple levels, representation of community interests and power-sharing capacity of state mechanisms also come under question here.
THROUGH THE LENS OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR: ANALYSIS
More often than not, voter choices are influenced by the prevalent dominant ideas around them. The prevalent discourse that surrounds voters is situated within a specific context of their political and social realities, and how they identify with given realities. Andrew Heywood in his book ‘Politics’ explained this very phenomenon through the Dominant Ideology Model. It is through the information voters are provided by the possessors of knowledge – educational institutions, government and media – that they perceive their position in the society (Heywood, 2019). The prevalence of such a political atmosphere also forces governments to formulate policies that correspond to the dominant ideology.
In situations where a single idea or ideology stands unparalleled and unchallenged, political parties tend to appropriate that idea and use it for their political gains. However, it is the national level parties that have the greatest advantage here due to their mass appeal and omnipresence, supported by their ability to invest more funds into campaigning. Conduction of simultaneous elections would result in the intensification of a single idea that could be capitalised by bigger political parties to increase their vote bank. Compounding the languages used into a meta-narrative, that would be issued for campaigning for both national level and state level seats, would make distinguishing between national issues and regional issues very difficult for the voters. Resounding the same concern, a former judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice P.B. Sawant mentioned how simultaneous elections may steamroll voters into voting for the same party due to distorted opinions (ADR, 2018). Since the dictum would be set by group behaviour and communal issues will take the forefront, the immensely constructive practice of “issue voting” where voter behaviour is influenced by party policies and calculated individual self-interests would surely take a back seat.
Issue voting is seen as an important characteristic under Heywood’s Rational Choice Model, which shifts attention away from groups and community socialisation, and towards individual rational actors who believe in maximisation of benefits and minimisation of losses. Here, voting is seen as a rational act since individual electors are believed to decide their party preferences based on personal self-interest. “Rather than being habitual, a manifestation of broader attachments and allegiances, voting is seen as essentially instrumental; that is, as a means to an end” (Heywood, 2019).
In tandem with a single dominant ideology, simultaneous elections provide major national-level parties sway over the voters by “default” as well. Since rational voters are driven by amassing maximum benefit in a situation where the lines between regional issues and national issues are strategically blurred, they try to ensure that their vote does not go to waste. When a majority of public opinion is in favour of a party, voters tend to vote for that party to boost its chances of coming to power and avoiding any possibility of re-election, especially in a system like India’s which is characterised by plurality and majoritarianism (Evans, 2012).
We must acknowledge the asymmetry in the resources possessed by bigger political parties vis-a-vis smaller political parties. The inability of the latter to perform well on a bigger platform, for instance during simultaneous elections, stems from their restricted resources and incapacity to capitalise on an overarching narrative. The incoming of simultaneous elections would accentuate the said asymmetry by augmenting the clout bigger parties hold, thus creating unilateralism and severe voter bias.
CONCLUSION
This article first introduced the idea of simultaneous elections followed by establishing the need for the analysis of voting behaviour. It mentioned the primary arguments presented by existing reports and commentaries on voter bias in simultaneous elections and gave some statistics corroborating the possibility of favouritism towards more established national-level political parties. Furthermore, the article employed a theoretical understanding of voting behaviour to explain voter actions when simultaneous elections are conducted. The analysis suggested a possible detour from ideals of federalism and a strong presence of voter bias that could work together against inclusive representation.
Given the concerning hits towards federalism that the past few years have seen, the suggestion of simultaneous elections will only further damage the prospects of building accountable and public interest-driven governments. In an age where sensationalisation of rhetoric has started winning global elections, limiting the impact of populist mandates could see the revitalisation of the liberal political culture that is at severe risk of being eliminated. Concerns of minorities could be systematically compromised or overlooked if the trend of populism is institutionally instilled, which raises concerns against the Aristotelian nightmare of demagoguery that might realistically set in. Given the recent political turmoil that the incumbent Central government has been a party to, the policy of One Nation, One Poll will only further inflame the sentiments of the Populus. In the background of lack of capacity-building enterprises that increase the faith that the denizens have towards the Centre, this policy will face several impediments in its implementation.
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